USA v. Ahmed Judge by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-11-2011 
USA v. Ahmed Judge 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Ahmed Judge" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 385. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/385 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











a/k/a EDY; a/k/a BLEEK 
 
        Ahmed Judge, 
               Appellant 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
D.C. Criminal No. 06-cr-00076-002 
(Honorable Joseph E. Irenas) 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 13, 2011 
Before:  SLOVITER, SCIRICA and SMITH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: October 11, 2011 ) 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 A federal jury found Ahmed Judge guilty of four offenses: conspiracy to commit 
drug trafficking, murder in furtherance of a drug-trafficking conspiracy, murder in the 
course of a firearms offense, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.  Judge 
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raises several claims of error on appeal: (1) insufficiency of the evidence on three of his 
charges; (2) failure to suppress his allegedly unlawfully obtained statements; (3) 
erroneous denial of his motion to sever offenses; (4) failure to declare a mistrial after the 
government was unable to produce an expert witness to whom it referred in its opening 
statement; and (5) trial testimony that allegedly ran afoul of his Fifth Amendment rights.
1
 




 Raymond Morales, who served as one of the government‘s key cooperating 
witnesses in this case, was the leader of a large-scale drug-trafficking organization based 
in Camden, New Jersey. Between 1993 and 2004, Morales‘s organization sold hundreds 
of kilograms of cocaine and cocaine base. Morales distributed both through ―drug sets,‖ 
areas known for drug sales he operated in Camden, and through sub-organizations headed 
by individuals with whom Morales was friendly. One such sub-organization was led by 
Jevon Lewis. During the early 1990s through 1995, and from early 2001 through 
September 2002, Lewis bought cocaine in bulk from Morales.
3
 Lewis sold at his own 
―drug sets‖ in Camden, including one at 8th and Central Streets. Ahmed Judge worked 
                                                 
1
 Judge also joins two arguments presented by co-defendant and co-appellant Mack 
Jones. Those claims allege the government failed to prove the existence of a single 
conspiracy, and the court erroneously permitted certain testimony from expert David 
McNamara. We find both arguments unavailing for reasons set forth in the companion 
case, United States v. Jones, No. 09-2955 (3d Cir. October 11 , 2011). 
2
 ―[W]e set forth the facts on the basis of the evidence favorable to the government as the 
verdict winner[.]‖ United States v. Lore, 430 F.3d 190, 197 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005). 
3




for Lewis for a period of time in 2001 and 2002, functioning primarily as an armed body-
man or ―enforcer‖ at Lewis‘s sets. Mack Jones headed a second subgroup that sourced 
from Morales. Jones purchased cocaine from Morales from 1994 through 2003, including 
during periods when Morales was in jail. Troy Clark ran a third group that sourced 
through Morales, the ―MOB Boys.‖  
 On September 8, 2001, an individual was shot and killed at Morales‘s drug set at 
Atlantic and Norris Streets. Morales believed violence at his markets was bad for 
business, and wanted to retaliate. Morales mistakenly believed the perpetrator was 
Kenneth Fussell, and offered Jevon Lewis $10,000 to have Fussell killed. Lewis accepted 
and contracted with Ahmed Judge and Jamar Bacon to carry out the murder. At 11:30 
p.m. on October 4, 2001, Judge and Bacon shot and killed Fussell on the front steps of 
Fussell‘s apartment in Camden.  
Camden police officer Sergeant Strang was two blocks away from the shooting 
when it occurred and went to the scene immediately. An eyewitness told Strang he saw, 
from his second story bathroom, an African-American male wearing a sweatshirt and a 
baseball cap flee to a nearby field. Strang searched the field and within minutes, found 
Judge hiding behind hay bales, squatting on a sweatshirt and a baseball cap. Strang asked 
Judge to show his hands and when Judge did not respond, Strang directed another officer 
to handcuff him. Judge told Strang he had been shot. When Strang asked by whom, Judge 
did not respond. Strang asked if the clothes Judge was sitting upon belonged to him, and 
Judge answered affirmatively.  
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Hours later, at approximately 4:00 a.m. on October 5th, Judge was given Miranda 
warnings at the Camden police station, which he waived, and was questioned by Officer 
Kellejan. Judge made exculpatory statements. On November 3, 2001, Judge was arrested 
for the Fussell murder and brought to the Camden police station. He was again issued 
Miranda warnings, which he waived, and was again questioned by Officer Kellejan. 
Judge reaffirmed his statements from his session with Kellejan on October 5th. 
A grand jury returned a four-count superceding indictment against Ahmed Judge, 
Jevon Lewis, and Mack Jones. Count One charged defendants with conspiracy to 
distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, under 21 
U.S.C. § 846 (conspiracy) and § 841(b)(1)(A) (drug trafficking);
4
 Count Two charged 
Judge and Lewis with murder in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise or a drug-
trafficking conspiracy, under 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A); Count Three charged Judge and 
Lewis with murder in the course of a firearms offense, under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and 
Count Four charged Judge with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, under 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g). After a two-month trial, the jury found the defendants guilty on all 
counts. The court sentenced Judge to concurrent terms of life imprisonment on Counts 
One and Two, a consecutive term of 120 months on Count Three, and a concurrent term 
of 120 months on Count Four. It sentenced Lewis to concurrent terms of life 
imprisonment on Counts One and Two, and a consecutive term of 120 months on Count 
Three. It sentenced Jones to a term of life imprisonment. All three defendants filed 
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 The indictment of April 25, 2007, also charged Dennis Rodriguez, Francisco Morales, 
Ruben Lozada, and Mark Davis on Count One. These co-defendants pled guilty.  
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appeals. We decide Ahmed Judge‘s appeal in this opinion, and Lewis and Jones‘s appeals 
in companion opinions. 
II. 
Judge contends he should be acquitted of three of his convictions – for conspiracy, 
murder in furtherance of a drug-trafficking conspiracy, and murder in the course of a 
firearms offense – for lack of sufficient evidence. When adjudicating a sufficiency of the 
evidence challenge, ―we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
government,‖ United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679, 684 (3d Cir. 1999), and affirm 
―if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.‖ United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  We examine the ―totality of the evidence, both 
direct and circumstantial‖ and ―credit all available inferences in favor of the 
government.‖ United States v. Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2003).  
There was sufficient evidence to convict Judge for conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 
846 and § 841(b)(1)(A). Conspiracy requires (1) an ―agreement‖ between two or more 
persons to commit an illegal act, and (2) that a defendant voluntarily participate in the 
agreement through ―shar[ing] a unity of purpose‖ with at least one co-conspirator. See 
Applewhaite, 195 F.3d at 684. To show voluntary participation in a drug-trafficking 
conspiracy, the government must prove the defendant ―knew that the purpose of the 
agreement was the specific unlawful purpose . . . [of] possession of a controlled 
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substance with intent to distribute.‖ United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 403, 405 (3d Cir. 
1997). 
Judge argues the government did not prove his participation in a conspiracy to 
traffic drugs, nor his sharing a unity of purpose with any co-conspirator.
5
 The evidence, 
Judge claims, ―at worst placed [him] in the company of drug dealers.‖ We disagree. 
Several government witnesses testified about Judge‘s active participation in Jevon 
Lewis‘s cocaine distribution operations throughout 2001 and 2002. One witness, Bernard 
Murray, testified to regularly visiting Lewis‘s drug set at 8th and Central Streets, where 
he would see Judge onsite, armed with a gun. Three MOB Boys testified about 
conversations they had with Judge in 2001, during which he complained about the quality 
of Lewis‘s crack cocaine, asked for advice about running a drug operation, and 
strategized about opening a new drug set with Lewis at 10th and Van Hook Streets. 
Additionally, the government introduced records showing 135 phone calls between Judge 
and Lewis over a five week period in May and June of 2001.  Taken as a whole, this 
evidence provided a sufficient basis upon which a rational jury ―could have found the 
essential elements‖ of Lewis‘s conspiring to traffic cocaine and cocaine base beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Dent, 149 F.3d at 187. 
                                                 
5
 Judge concedes the government presented sufficient evidence of an agreement to 
unlawfully distribute cocaine.  
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Furthermore, there was sufficient evidence to convict for murder in furtherance of 
a drug-trafficking conspiracy.
6
 The statute provides: ―[A]ny person engaging in any 
offense punishable under section 841(b)(1)(A) of this title . . . who intentionally kills or 
counsels, commands, induces,  procures, or causes the intentional killing of an individual 
and such killing results shall be [subject to punishment].‖ 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A). 
Accordingly, the elements of a murder charge under § 848 are: an ―intentiona[l]‖ killing; 
by a defendant ―engaging‖ in an act punishable under § 841(b)(1)(A) (e.g., drug-
trafficking conspiracy); and a nexus between the killing and the § 841(b) offense. See 
United States v. Santos, 541 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir. 2008) (requiring ―a meaningful 
connection between the killing and the drug offense‖).7  
Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, ample evidence 
demonstrated Judge‘s guilt on all three elements of murder in furtherance of a drug-
trafficking conspiracy. As for an ―intentional killing,‖ an eyewitness saw Judge fleeing 
from the shooting, Sergeant Strang found Judge hiding in a field thirty yards away from 
                                                 
6
The government argues Judge failed to preserve his sufficiency of the evidence objection 
for this murder count, warranting plain error review. Gov‘t Br. at 56, 62. However, in his 
Rule 29 motion filed at the conclusion of the government‘s case, Judge contested the 
sufficiency of the evidence on the § 848 murder charge. Thus, the Dent standard of 
review is appropriate. 
7
 Judge argues an additional mens rea element should be read into the statute: knowledge 
that the killing was in furtherance of the conspiracy.  But Judge cites no authority from 
this circuit supporting his position. Rather, he urges we follow United States v. 
McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 1997), in which he claims the Tenth Circuit required 
―outside contractor[s to] know of the connection between the homicide‖ and the 
conspiracy. Appellant Br. at 54. Even if we were to follow McCullah, it is readily 
distinguishable from this case. The defendant in McCullah was hired solely for the § 848 
murder and had no other connection to the conspiracy. Judge meanwhile was convicted 
of the underlying conspiracy the murder furthered.  
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the murder weapon (subsequently recovered by two other officers), and two MOB Boys 
testified that Judge confessed to them he had killed Kenneth Fussell. As for Judge‘s 
―engaging‖ in an act punishable under § 841(b)(1)(A), in his case, conspiracy to traffic 
drugs, several government witnesses described Judge as a regular ―muscle‖ at Lewis‘s 
drug sets, and the government‘s phone records showed a pattern of correspondence 
between Judge and Lewis consistent with conspiracy to sell drugs. As for a nexus 
between the killing and the drug-trafficking conspiracy, Raymond Morales testified in 
detail about arranging for Fussell‘s death as well as his retaliatory motive.  
There was also sufficient evidence with respect to murder in the course of a firearms 
offense. Judge‘s arguments on this charge are derivative of those he makes for the 
conspiracy charge – contending that because the government failed to prove his 
participation in a drug-trafficking conspiracy, it also failed to prove his responsibility for 
murder in the course of firearm offense, undertaken to carry out the conspiracy. Because 
we reject Judge‘s argument on the conspiracy charge, we reject this argument as well. 
III. 
Judge contends the court erred in denying his motions to suppress three sets of his 
statements. We review factual findings in a suppression hearing for clear error, and 
exercise plenary review over the court‘s application of law to those facts. United States v. 
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Tracey, 597 F.3d 140, 146 (3d Cir. 2010). The court‘s decision to admit Judge‘s 
statements was justified by both the facts and the law.
8
  
First, Judge argues his statements to Sergeant Strang during their in-field 
encounter on the night of October 4th should have been suppressed because there were no 
Miranda warnings.
9
 The District Court rejected Judge‘s motion to suppress because it 
found Strang‘s questioning of Judge in the field to fall squarely under Quarles‘s public 
safety exception. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 659 n.8 (1984) (holding an 
individual‘s statements, albeit not preceded by Miranda warnings, are admissible if the 
totality of the circumstances shows the officer‘s questions to ―relate to an objectively 
reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger‖). A 
shooting had occurred in a dense urban area near a community center; a witness had told 
Officer Strang a man in a sweatshirt and a baseball cap fled from the shooting to a nearby 
field; Officer Strang found Judge hiding among a sweatshirt and cap in the indicated 
                                                 
8
 Judge claims error from the denial of his request for an evidentiary hearing. We review 
such a decision for abuse of discretion, and will reverse ―only in rare circumstances.‖ 
United States v. Hines, 628 F.3d 101, 104-105 (3d Cir. 2010). The court concluded the 
substance of Judge‘s suppression arguments had already been explored in an extensive 
proceeding in New Jersey state court, in July 2003. At that hearing, Judge made similar 
arguments to suppress his statements, Officers Strang and Kellejan had both testified, and 
Judge had cross-examined each. The district court found Judge failed to ―put forward any 
real factual challenge‖ to the facts developed in the New Jersey proceeding, and an 
additional hearing would amount to no more than ―another shot at cross examining‖ the 
officers in the hopes Judge would discover new facts. Accordingly, it did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Judge‘s motion for a hearing on suppression. See Hines, 628 F.3d at 
105 (―A motion to suppress requires an evidentiary hearing only if . . . there are disputed 
issues of material fact that will affect the outcome of the motion to suppress.‖). 
9
 Judge volunteered to Officer Strang he had been shot. Judge also told Officer Strang the 
sweatshirt and baseball cap he was sitting on top of were his.  
10 
 
field; and upon seeing the officers, Judge volunteered he had been shot. Under the 
circumstances, the court was justified in construing Strang‘s questions as driven by an 
―objectively reasonable need‖ to secure the public safety – namely, to locate the missing 
firearm and prevent further violence. See United States v. Watters, 572 F.3d 479, 482-83 
(8th Cir. 2009) (holding ―the officers‘ questions were designed to locate a weapon [the 
defendant] might have hidden shortly before his arrest‖ and so were ―prompted by a 
concern for public safety‖); United States v. Are, 590 F.3d 499, 506 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(―[Q]uestioning a suspect about whether he has a gun may fall within Quarles‘ public 
safety exception.‖).10 The court‘s determination that Judge‘s in-field statements were 
admissible under Quarles was proper.  
Judge also contends two sets of his statements to Officer Kellejan, the first of 
which was made hours after the October 4th shooting and second of which was made 
after Judge was arrested for Fussell‘s murder on November 3, 2001, should have been 
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 The district court‘s application of Quarles also finds support in the Supreme Court‘s 
reasoning in a recent decision, Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). Although 
Bryant was a Confrontation Clause case rather than a Fifth Amendment case, the Court 
held an individual‘s statements to the police were not ―testimonial‖ and did not trigger a 
defendant‘s rights under the Confrontation Clause, because the ―primary purpose of the 
interrogation‖ had been to address an ongoing emergency. Id. at 1165-66 (―[T]he ultimate 
inquiry is whether the ‗primary purpose of the interrogation [was] to enable police 
assistance to meet [the] ongoing emergency‘ . . . [T]he police responded to a call that a 
man had been shot. . . . [T]hey did not know why, where, or when the shooting had 
occurred. Nor did they know the location of the shooter or anything else about the 
circumstances in which the crime occurred. The questions they asked—‗what had 
happened, who had shot him, and where the shooting occurred,‘—were the exact type of 
questions necessary to allow the police to  ‗assess the situation, the threat to their own 
safety, and possible danger to the potential victim‘ and to the public . . . In other words, 
they solicited the information necessary to enable them ‗to meet an ongoing 
emergency.‘‖) (citations omitted). 
11 
 
suppressed. On both occasions, Judge had been taken to the Camden police station and 
given Miranda warnings. On both occasions, Judge had orally acknowledged his rights 
and signed a Miranda waiver form. Although not alleging any procedural Miranda 
violations, Judge contends his statements were involuntary.
11
  With respect to his 
statements on the early morning of October 5th, Judge argues he had been in custody 
without food and water for seven hours before being interrogated, and anything he said 
was accordingly ―the product of psychological duress.‖ With respect to November 3rd, 
Judge argues his statements were involuntary because they were ―based on the 
unconstitutionally obtained statements . . . made . . . on October 5.‖  
The District Court correctly rejected Judge‘s involuntariness claims. In 
determining whether a confession is voluntary, a court ―must satisfy [itself] that the 
confession was the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker . 
. . and that the apellant‘s will was not overborne.‖ United States v. Swint, 15 F.3d 286, 
289 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Here, relying on the 
transcript from a New Jersey state court proceeding during which Judge developed his 
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 In his October 5th session with Officer Kellejan, Judge admitted to being in the 
neighborhood at the time of the shooting. He said while on Chelton Street, individuals in 
a vehicle began to shoot at him, and he ran away. Judge was unable to describe the 
individuals who shot him, nor could he think of any reason people would want to shoot 
him. When Officer Kellejan asked Judge to point out where he was shot, Judge said he 
was not sure he had been wounded that evening. Rather, he showed Officer Kellejan a 
scar on his ankle which he said he received four weeks earlier. Judge denied having any 
involvement in the shooting of Kenneth Fussell and denied having a gun that evening. He 
admitted the hoodie and baseball cap found at the scene were his. In his session on 
November 3, 2001, Judge reiterated his statements from the previous interview about the 
events of October 4, 2001. 
12 
 
suppression arguments at length, the District Court found ―nothing in the record that 
suggests [Judge‘s will] was overborn‖ on either October 5th or November 3rd. The court 
found no evidence of threats or coercive comments made by the officers during the 
interviews, nor any indication Judge was physically distressed.  Accordingly, the court 





 Judge contends the court erred in denying his pretrial motion to sever his two 
murder counts from his drug conspiracy count. We review for abuse of discretion, United 
States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 568 (3d Cir. 1991), and ―look to the indictment and not 
the subsequent proof adduced at trial‖ when conducting such review. United States v. 
Thornton, 1 F.3d 149, 153 (3d Cir. 1993).  If the denial was improper, we determine 
whether it led to ―clear and substantial prejudice resulting in a manifestly unfair trial.‖ 
Eufrasio, 935 F.2d at 568. 
 The court did not abuse its discretion. Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b), an indictment 
may charge two or more defendants with multiple offenses if the defendants ―are alleged 
to have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of acts or 
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 Any error with respect to the district court‘s admission of Judge‘s statements, either to 
Sergeant Strang in the field or to Officer Kellejan at the station, would have been 
harmless. There was considerable evidence of Judge‘s guilt of Fussell‘s murder wholly 
independent of his statements to the police. This evidence included Judge‘s confessions 
to the MOB Boys, eyewitness testimony placing Judge fleeing from the shooting, and the 




transactions, constituting an offense or offenses.‖13 Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(b). Rule 8(b) 
allows for joinder of a conspiracy charge and substantive counts arising out of that 
conspiracy, ―since the claim of conspiracy provides a common link, and demonstrates the 
existence of a common scheme or plan.‖ United States v. Somers, 496 F.2d 723, 729-30 
(3d Cir. 1974). In the indictment, the government explicitly linked each murder charge to 
the drug-trafficking conspiracy charge. Count 2, alleging murder in furtherance of a drug 
conspiracy, stated Judge killed Fussell ―while engaging in . . . the conspiracy to distribute 
. . . crack cocaine . . . as charged in Count One of this Superseding Indictment.‖ Count 3, 
for murder in the course of a firearms offense, used identical language. Accordingly, the 
court did not abuse its discretion in finding Judge‘s conspiracy and murder charges to 
arise out of the ―same series of acts or transactions‖ as envisioned by Rule 8(b) and in 
thus denying the motion to sever. See Irizzary, 341 F.3d at 289-90 (―[W]e conclude that 
the superceding indictment did not improperly join separate, unrelated crimes allegedly 
committed by Irizarry. Rather, he was charged with a RICO substantive violation and a 
RICO conspiracy violation, and all of the criminal acts charged against him in the 
superceding indictment . . . satisif[y] the ‗same act or transaction‘ requirement of Rule 
8(b).‖).  
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 When a defendant is charged with multiple counts in a multi-defendant case, joinder of 
his offenses is governed by Rule 8(b). See United States v. Irizzary, 341 F.3d 273, 287 
(3d Cir. 2003) (―Rule 8(a) ‗dealing with the joinder of offenses, applies only to 
prosecutions involving a single defendant‘ . . .[I]n a multi-defendant case such as this, 





Judge claims the court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial, proffered after 
the government was unable to produce a gunshot residue expert to whom it had referred 
earlier. During its opening statement, the government informed the jury it intended to call 
an expert witness, Dr. Elzbieta Bakowska, to testify about gunshot residue found on 
Judge‘s hands after the shooting. Due to her severe illness, however, the government was 
unable to call Dr. Bakowska. Judge moved for a mistrial. The court denied his motion but 
instructed the jury to disregard the government‘s references to Dr. Bakowska. We review 
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Retos, 25 F.3d 1220, 1224 (3d Cir. 1994).  
 The court‘s denial was not an abuse of discretion. When a ―prosecutor‘s remarks 
taken in the context of the trial as a whole, [are] sufficiently prejudicial to have deprived 
the defendant of his right to a fair trial,‖ a declaration of mistrial may be appropriate. 
Retos, 25 F.3d at 1226. But this is a high standard. A reviewing court should assess ―the 
severity of the conduct, the effect of the curative instructions, and the quantum of 
evidence against the defendant.‖ Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 95, 107 (3d Cir. 2001).  The 
court concluded the government‘s references to Dr. Bakowska in its opening statement 
had been minor compared to the quantity of evidence in the case as a whole,  and that a 
curative jury instruction would dispel any potential prejudice.
14
  This assessment was 
reasonable. See, e.g., United States v. DeRosa, 548 F.2d 464, 472 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding 
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 The instruction directed the jury to ―completely disregard all such statements by the 
prosecution‖ about a gun residue expert, and to assume ―[t]here is no evidence in this 
case that there was any gunshot residue on Mr. Judge‘s hand at any time.‖ 
15 
 
the government‘s reference to wiretap evidence during its opening did not cause undue 
prejudice because a jury instruction was sufficiently curative). 
VI. 
 Finally, Judge argues the court erred in failing to declare a mistrial or to grant a 
limiting instruction after Sergeant Strang testified about several instances of Judge‘s 
silence during their in-field encounter on October 4th. We review for abuse of discretion. 
Complaint of Consol. Coal Co., 123 F.3d 126, 131 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 During the government‘s direct examination, Sergeant Strang testified to five 
instances of Judge‘s silence – or failure to volunteer information –in the field after the 
Fussell shooting. Strang stated: (1) Judge did not respond when asked who had shot him; 
(2) Judge did not respond when Strang asked if an ID card found on him belonged to 
him; (3) Judge did not volunteer information on why someone had been shooting at him; 
(4) Judge did not state that he was in pain; (5) Judge did not mention why he was in the 
area at that time. Strang explained that throughout this encounter, Judge had been 
handcuffed as a security measure but had not been given Miranda warnings nor 
arrested.
15
   
                                                 
15
 When Strang was testifying to these matters during trial, Judge‘s counsel did not raise 
contemporaneous objections. The following day, however, Judge‘s counsel moved for a 
mistrial or a limiting instruction, arguing Strang‘s testimony about Judge‘s silence had 
run afoul of Judge‘s Fifth Amendment freedom from self-incrimination. The district court 
temporarily denied both motions and accepted briefing. Subsequently, it ruled Strang‘s 
testimony had not raised constitutional problems and neither a mistrial nor limiting 
instruction was needed. 
16 
 
 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding Strang‘s testimony 
about Judge‘s silence did not intrude on Judge‘s Fifth Amendment rights. A person‘s 
silence in the face of police questioning before he has been issued Miranda warnings can 
be considered substantively against him at trial, without triggering the Fifth Amendment. 
See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 2002) (sustaining the 
prosecution‘s substantive use of the defendant‘s silence in the face of officer questioning 
because the bar against such evidence ―does not apply to the post-arrest, pre-Miranda 
warnings situation‖); see also Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 335 (3d Cir. 
2010) (―Not every reference to a defendant‘s silence, however, results in a Doyle 
violation. Where ‗no governmental action induce[s] the defendant to remain silent,‘ the 
Miranda-based fairness rationale does not control.‖ (citing Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 
603, 606 (1982)). We also note that the District Court had previously adjudicated a 
suppression motion and concluded Strang‘s failure to issue Miranda warnings before 
questioning Judge in the field was proper. See supra. Accordingly, Strang‘s testimony 
about Judge‘s silence did not necessitate a mistrial or a curative instruction.16 
VII. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.  
                                                 
16
 Any legal error in admitting Strang‘s testimony about Judge‘s silence would have been 
harmless. Strang‘s description of Judge‘s various episodes of silence consisted of a few 
lines of questioning out of a 7000 page trial transcript.  After such questioning, the 
prosecution did not make subsequent reference to Strang‘s testimony about Judge‘s 
silence, neither during trial nor in its closing argument. Accordingly, the prejudicial 
impact of Strang‘s testimony was minimal at best. 
